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This Chapter Verse Commentaries:
Of Earthly Happiness, its Impediments and Means of Advancement
Chap. 3–5.
A. The substance of earthly happiness or success consists in grateful joy of this life, and a righteous use of it.
Ecc_3:1-22.
1. The reasons for the temporal restriction of human happiness (consisting in the entire dependence of all human action and effort on an unchangeable, higher system of things)
(Ecc_3:1-11.)
(Ecc_3:12-22.)
[Ecc_3:1.— æְîָï This is one of the words relied upon to prove the later Hebraic, or Chaldaic, period of the book. We have, however, no right to say that a word running through the Shemitic tongues [as thia is found in Arabic, Syriac, Ethiopia, as well as Hebrew] is peculiar to any one of them, or borrowed from any one of them, though circumstances may have made it rare in an oariy dialect, perhaps on account of a precision of meaning raruly needed, whilst it has become loose and vulgarized in another. It may have been well known in the days of Soiomon, though seldom used when the more indefinite òֵú would answer. òֵú means time generally, îåֹòֵã a fixed time (like a yearly festival), æîï its earlier sense, before it became vulgarized, a time or an occasion precisely adapted to a purpose. Hence we see its very probable connection with æîí proponit, and having also tho sense of binding, like Arabic Òãّ ’ the purpose linked to the due occasion. This suits all the acts following, as more or less tho result of purpose In a time proposed. It has good support, too, etymologically, in the final í changiug to the ï as is the tendency in other words. Thus, besides other examples, Lam_3:22, according to Rabbi Tanchum, úּîí becomes úּîï to avoid the harshness of tho final î making úָּîְîåּ = úָּîְðåּ “they are not consumed,” or spent [that is, the mercies of the Lord instead of “we are not consumed.” We may be assured that the writer did not intend a tautology hero. æîï is more precise than òú as it has more of purpose than îåֹòֵã which relates to things immovable.—T. L.]
[Ecc_3:18.— òìÎãּáøú E. V. On account of the sons of men. Compare Psa_110:4, after the manner of.LXX., ðåñὶ ëáëéᾶò Vulgate, simply, de filiis. Syriac, òì îîììà after the speech of men—morehumano—humanly speaking,which seems the most suitable of any, for reasons given in the Exeget. and Note.—T. L.]
[Ecc_3:18.— äֵîָä ìָäֶí Literally, themselves to themselves—in their own estimation. ìְáָøָí to prove them—make it clear, literally, (LXX., äéáêñéíåῖ áὐôïὺò vulg ut probaret), let them see from themselves, or from their own conduct fo themselves, how like beasts they are. This qualified sense is very different from asserting that they are beasts absolutely. The key to it all is in the òì ãáøú above. The writer is speaking more humano-tho judgment that must bo pronounced if men were judged by their own ways.—T. L.]
[Ecc_3:21— äָòֹìָä It can only mean, as it stands in tho text, “that which goeth up.” An effort has been made to give it another turn by pointing ä as interrogative. It is sufficient to say that it is against the text For oLhtr reasons against H, see Exeget. and Note—T. L]
2. First Division, first strophe.
Ecc_3:1-8. Every human action and effort are subject to the law of’ time and temporal change.—To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under heaven.—“Every thing,” namely, every thing that man undertakes or does on earth; a very general expression, more clearly defined by the following ëָּìÎçֵôֶõ every business, every undertaking, but more clearly illustrated in the subsequent verses in a number of special examples.— æְîָï lit., precision, limitation, indicates in later style (Neh_2:6; Est_9:27; Est_9:31), a certain period, a term for any thing, whilst tho more common òú [lime) signifies a division of time in general.
Ecc_3:2. A time- to be born and a time to die.—This is the original text, as is the same turn until the 8th verse. The Sept. and the Vulg. express this construction genitively [ êáéñὸò ôïῦ ôÝêåéí tempus nascendi, etc.) The word ìָìֶãֶú does not stand for the passive ìְäִåָּìֵã to be born (Vulg., Luther, Ewalt, Gesenius, Elsies.),, but like all the fol-lowing infinitives, is to be taken actively: to bear. The constant usage of the Old Testament favors this rendering with reference to the verb éָìַã and also the circumstance that with, ìֶäֶú an undertaking ( çֵôֶõ ), a conscious and intentional action or business is to be named, which can only be said of the maternal part of the act of human birth, and not of that of the child. Death fittingly follows closely to birth. By this juxtaposition of the acts which mark the entrance into life and the exit from it, the whole arena within which the subsequent actions are performed, is from the beginning “ marked by its fixed limits ”(Hitzig). A time to plant and a time to pluck up that which is planted.—For the affinity between these two ideas and that of birth and death, comp. Pro_12:12; Ps. 1:37; 37:35 f.; Psa_92:13 f.; Psa_128:3; Dan_4:11; Dan_4:20; Mat_3:8-10; Mat_7:17 f.; Mat_15:18. ìַòֲ÷åֹø probably from Chald. òִ÷ָּø “root,” means originally to root out, to unroot, but is always elsewhere in the o. T. used metaphorically, e.g., of the destruction of cities (Zep_2:4), of striking down horses or oxen, and making them useless by severing the sinews of their hind feet. (Gen_49:6 :).
Ecc_3:3.—A time to kill and a time to heal.—A negative thought here precedes, as also in the subsequent clauses, till the first of Ecc_3:5, after which, until the end, the positive or negative idea alternately precedes. “To kill” ( äֲøåֹâ lit., cut down, or stab) indicates the inflicting of the very wounds whose healing the following verb points out.
Ecc_3:4 : A time to weep, etc.— ìִáְëåֹú appears only on account of similarity of sound to be placed immediately after ìִּáְåֹú as in the following clause: øְ÷åֹã to leap, to danee, appears to be chosen on account of its like sounding ending as a contrast to ñְôåֹã to lament ( êüðôåóèáé plangere).Ecc_3:5. A time to cast away stones, and a time to gather stones together.—In this first expression there is, of course, no allusion to the destruction of the temple, of which, according to Mar_13:2, not one stone shall remain upon another (as Hengstenberg and others think), and quite as little to the stoning of malefactors, or to the throwing of stones on the fields of enemies, according to 2Ki_3:19; 2Ki_3:25 (Hitzig, Elster, etc. But äַùְׁìִéêְ àֲáðéí is here identical with ñִ÷ֵì “to free from stones,” Isa_5:2; Isa_62:10, and alludes therefore to the gathering and throwing away of stones from the fields, vineyards, etc.; whilst the latter expression naturally means the collecting of stones for the construction of houses (as Vaihinqer justly observes).__A time to embrace, and a time to refrain from embracing.—Whether the connection of the preceding expressions with çֲáåֹ÷ to embrace, is really effected by the fact that one embraces with the hand the stone to be cast, as Hitzig supposes, is very doubtful. At all events, however, çá÷ means the embrace of love (Pro_5:20), and-the intensive in the second rank is purposely placed there to indicate that every excess of sexual intercourse is injurious.
Ecc_3:6. A time to get, and a time to lose.— àִáֵּã as a contrast to áִּ÷ֵּùׁ must clearly here mean to lose (or also to be lost, to abstain from getting, Vaihinger) although it every where else means to destroy, to ruin; for in all the remaining clauses of the series, the second verb asserts directly the opposite of the first. In contrast to the unintentional losing, the corresponding verb äַùְׁìִéêְ of the second clause then indicates an intentional casting away of a possession to be preserved (2Ki_7:15; Eze_20:8).—A time to rend and a time to sew.—One might here suppose the rending of garments on hearing sad tidings (1 Sam. 1:11; 3:39; Job_1:20; Job_2:12; Mat_26:63), and again the sewing up of the garments that had been thus rent as a sign of grief. And also by the following “to keep silence” one would first think of the mournful silence of the sorrowing (Gen_34:5; Job_2:13)
Ecc_3:8. A time to love, etc.—Love and hatred, war and peace, forming an inter-relation with each other, are now connected with the contents of the preceding verse by the intermediary thought of the agreeable and disagreeable, or of well and evil doing.
3. First Division, second strophe
Ecc_3:9-11. In consequence of the temporal character of all worldly action and effort, human knowledge is also especially ineffective and feeble in presence of the unsearchable ruling of the Eternal One.—What profit hath he that worketh in that wherein he laboureth?—That is, what profit do all the various, antagonistic actions, of which a number has just been quoted (Ecc_3:3-8) bring to man ? The question is one to which a decidedly negative answer is expected, and draws therefore a negative result from the preceding reflection: There is nothing lasting, no continuous happiness here below.
Ecc_3:10. I have seen the travail, etc.—Comp. Ecc_1:13. This verse has simply a transitional meaning; it prepares us for the more accurate description given in Ecc_3:11 of the inconstant, transitory and feeble condition of human knowledge and effort, in the presence of the unsearchable wisdom of God.
Ecc_3:11. He hath made every thing beautiful in his time—The principal emphasis rests on the word áְּòִúּåֹ “in his time,” as the connection with the foregoing Ecc_3:1-8 shows. God has arranged all things beautifully in this life (comp. Gen_1:31), but always only “in his time,” always only so that it remains beautiful and good for man during its restricted time, but after that becomes an evil for him; therefore always only so that the glory of this earth soon reaches its end.—Also he hath set the world in their heart.—(Zöckler’s rendering, eternity in their heart).—That is, in the hearts of men; for the suffix in áְּìִáָּí refers to the children of men in Ecc_3:11, whilst in the subsequent clause the individual man äָàָãָí is placed opposite to the one God. This clause clearly holds a rising relation to the contents of the preceding: God has here below not only arranged all things well for man in this temporal period; He has even given them eternity in their hearts. This is clearly the author’s train of thought. With eternity given to the heart cf man, he also means the knowledge of God’s eternal nature and rule, innate even in the natural man, that notitia Dei naturalis insita s, innata, which Paul, Rom_1:19 f., describes as an intellectual perception of God’s eternal power and divinity, peculiar as such to man, and which develops itself in the works of creation. It appears as well from the word áְּìִáָּí (heart, here in the same sense as Ecc_1:13-17, etc.)i as from the following: “So that no man can find out,” that it is substantially this natural knowledge of God, namely, something belonging to the realm of human conception, a moral good from the sphere of intellectual life,—that the author means by the expression äָòåֹìָí (consequently not simply the character of immortality)—although he must have considered this closely connected with the natural conception of God, according to Ecc_7:7. For this restrictive clause clearly expresses a restriction of human nature in an intellectual sense, an inability to find, which is equal to an inability to know. But as certainly as this inability to know refers to the extent and limits of Divine action, so certainly will also the knowledge of the human heart, expressed by äָòåֹìָí be a religious knowledge referring to God and Divine things. Therefore we would reject as opposed to the text those explanations of äָòåֹìָí which give to this expression the sense of “world” (Vulg., Luther, Umbreit, Ewald, Ulster, etc.), or “worldly-mindedness” (Gesenius, Knobel), or “worldly wisdom,” “judgment” (Gaab, Spohn); also Hitzig, who, however, contends for òֵìֶí instead of òåìí And besides the connection, the style of the entire Old Testament and of this book is opposed to this rendering; according to them òåìí is always eternity (comp. Ecc_1:4; Ecc_1:10; Ecc_2:16; Ecc_3:14; Ecc_9:6; Ecc_11:5) and first receives the signification of “world macrocosmos” in the literature of the Talmud.—So that no man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning to the end.—That is, this one restriction is laid on this human conception of the Eternal One, that it can never obtain a perfect and truly adequate insight into the Divine plan of the world, but rather, is only able to perceive the unsearchable ways and incomprehensible decrees of God, fwgmentarily and in a glass darkly (Rom. 2:32; 1Co_13:12). îִáְּìִé àֲùֶׁø is here clearly in the sense of only that, “except that,” therefore synonymous with àֶôֶñ ëִּé formerly used for this (Amo_9:8; Jdg_4:9; 2Sa_11:14). Comp. Ewald, Lehrbuch, § 354 b. The deviating significations Vulg., Gesenius: “ita tit non;” (Sept., Herzpeld ὅðùò ìὴ : “in order not,” Knobel: “without that;” Hitzig, Umbreit, Hahn: “without which,” etc.) are not only inconsonant to the text, but without suflicient linguistic authority, so far as regards the signification of îִáְּìִé àֲùֶׁø —The author is here silent in respect to the profoundesfc reason why man cannot thoroughly know and comprehend the works and reign of God, that is the interruption of the original pure harmony of his Spirit by means of sin; he is so because he would seem rather, as it were, purposely to presuppose this fact than emphatically to express it.
4. Second Division, first strophe. Ecc_3:12-15. Human happiness is temporally restricted, consisting mainly in the cheerful enjoyment and proper use of tfte moment, because it depends on the immutable decrees qf divine laws, claiming fear and humble submission, rather than bold hope and effort.—I know that there is no good in them—namely, in the “children of men,” (Ecc_3:10) to whom the Ecc_3:11 already referred. áָּí “in them with them,” is mainly synonymous with “for them;” comp. Ecc_2:24. éָãַòְúּé is literally, “I have perceived, and I know in consequence thereof;” it means the past, in its result reaching into the future, here also as in Ecc_3:14.—But for a man to rejoice and do good in this life—Together with the gratefully cheerful enjoyment of life’s goods, the “doing good” is here named more distinctly than in Ecc_2:26, as a principal condition and occupation of human happiness. Anil therewith is also meant, as that passage shows, and as appears still more definitely from the parallels in Psa_34:14; Psa_37:3; Isa_38:3, etc., not merely benevolence, but uprightness, fulfilment of the divine commands (comp. Ecc_12:13). For the meaning of òֲùׂåֹú èåֹá in the sense of “be of good cheer,” to be merry (Aben Ezra, Luther, de Wette, Knobel, Hitzig, etc.) there is not a single philological proof; for in chap, Ecc_2:24; Ecc_3:22; Ecc_5:7, etc., there are similar phrases, but still materially different from this one, which express the sense of being merry.” — áְּçַéָּéå lit., “in his life” refers again to the singular äָàָãָí Ecc_3:11, so that in this verse the singular and the plural use of this verb alternates as in the preceding.
Ecc_3:13. And also that every man should eat and drink, etc., it is the gift of God. Clearly the same thought as in Ecc_2:24-25. The particle åְðַí introducing still another object of perception to éָãַòְúִּé besides that named already in Ecc_3:12, refers to the whole sentence. As to the peculiar construction of the first conditional clause without àִí or other particle, see Ewald, § 357, c.
Ecc_3:14. I know that -whatever God doeth it shall be forever. Herein it appears that all human action is dependent on the eternal law of God, and that especially all cheerful, undisturbed enjoyment of the blessings of this life, depends on the decrees of this highest law-giver and ruler of the world. Comp. the theoretical description of the ever constant course of divino laws in Ecc_1:4-11.—Nothing can be put to it, nor anything taken from it. To it ( òָìָéå ) namely, to all that everlastingly abiding order which God makes, to all those eternally valid enactments of the Most High. for the construction àֵéï ìְäåֹñִéó Comp. Ewald, § 237, c. For the sentence: Sir_18:5; Rev_22:18.—And God doeth it, that men should fear before Him.—And this by those very immutable laws of his world-ruling activity, on which men, with all their deeds and destiny, depend; comp. Ecc_9:12; 2Co_5:11; and for the construction: Eze_36:27; Rev_13:15. As in those places, so also here, the expression “doeth it that,” does not mean “in order that,” but “effecting that” “making it to be so,” accomplishing. By éָøִà “to fear,” Koheleth does not mean a feeling of terror and horror, but rather that sacred feeling of holy awe which we call reverence; but nevertheless “he here considers this reverence not as a beneficent blissful sensation, but rather as a depressing feeling of the yanity of man in contrast with the boundless fulness of the power of God, as an inward shudder at the bonds of the divine decree, which envelop him, and by which, in his conception, every spiritual movement is restricted in advance to a certain measure,” (Elster).
Ecc_3:15. That which hath been is now, and that which is to be hath already been.—( ëְּáַø äåּà ) i.e. already long present, comes of old (not exactly; is something old, as Hitzig translates, turning the adverb into a substantive). The second clause containing àֲùֶׁø ìִäְéåֹú says, literally, as in the English rendering: “that which is to be.” For the sentence comp. Ecc_1:9; Ecc_6:10, and especially Job_14:5; Psa_139:15, where still more clearly than here, is expressed the predestination of all the destinies of man by God.—And God requireth that which is past. (Lit., and God seeketh that which was crowded out). He again briags forth that which the vicissitudes of time had already crowded out, or pushed back into the past; Deus instaurat, quod abiit (Vulgate). This signification alone of éְáַ÷ֵùׁ àֶú ðִøְãָó is in accordance with the context not that given in the Sept. Syridc, Targ., Heng-stenberg, etc., according to which the allusion here would be to the divine consolation and gracious visitation of the persecuted, (Mat_5:10; Luk_19:10, etc.).
5. Second Division, second strophe. Ecc_3:16-22. The restriction of human happiness appears especially in the numerous cases of.unsatisfactory, indeed, apparently unjust, distribution of happiness and unhappiness, according to the moral worth and merit of men, as this mundane life reveals it, as well as in the uncertainty regarding the kind of reward in the world beyond, which ever exists in this world below. And moreover I saw under the sun.—The “moreover” ( òåֹã ) refers to Ecc_3:12, and therefore introduces something which comes as a new conception to the one there described (and also in Ecc_3:14 f.), and which holds the same relation to that as the special to the general.—The place of judgment, etc. Lit., at the place of judgment; for îְ÷åֹí here, and in the subsequent clause is strictly taken, not as the object of “I saw,” but, as the accents indicate, is an independent nominative (or locative)—an abrupt construction which produces a certain solemn impression well adapted to the excited feelings of the poet. îִùְׁôָè and öֶãֶ÷ judgment and righteousness, differ materially as objective and subjective, or as the judgment that must serve the judge as the absolute rule for his decisions, and as the practical judgment in the life of the normal man; the latter expression is, therefore, largely synonymous with “innocence,” virtue. In contrast to both ideas, Koheleth calls äָøֶùַׁò “the evil,” “the crime,” thinking of course, in the first place, of objective, and in the second place of subjective wrong, or, the first time, of crime as a wicked judge practices it, the second time, of the wantonness of the wicked in general.
Ecc_3:17. God shall judge the righteous and the wicked.—He will appoint to them, therefore that “judgment” which, according to Ecc_3:16, is so frequently in human life, either not to be found at all, or not in the right place; comp. Ecc_5:7; Deu_1:17; Psa_82:1 ff.—For there is a time there for every purpose, and every work.—That is, in heaven above, with God, the just judge, there is a time to judge every good and every evil deed of men. ùָׁí pointing upwards, (as in Gen_49:24, îִùָּׁí ) and òֵú here as elsewhere, is the “time of judicial decision, the term;” comp. Ecc_9:11-12, as well as the New Testament ἡìÝñá 1Co_3:13; 1Co_4:2, etc. Others read ùָׂí instead of ùָׁí “He has set a time for everything,” (Houbigant, Van dee Palm, Döderlein, Hitzig, Elster), but which is quite as unnecessary as the temporal signification of ùָׁí =time, in tempore judicii (Hibronymus), or as referring the expression to the earth as the seat of the tribunal here meant (Hahn), or as the explanation of ùָׁí according to the Talmud, in the sense of “appraising, taxing” (Furst, Vaihinger: “And He appraises every action”), or, finally, as Ewaln’s parenthesizing of the words ëִּé òֵú ìְëָìÎçֵôֶõ whereby the sentence acquires the following form: “God will judge the just and the unjust (for there is a time for everything), and will judge of every deed.”
Ecc_3:1-8.Concerning the sons of men, that God might manifest them. As the introductory words: “I said in my heart,” connect the verse with the preceding one, it assumes the same relation to Ecc_3:16 as to that, and to òַìÎãִáְèøַú áְּðֵé äָàָãָí and, therefore, the principal thought of this 16th verse is to be thus supplied: “On account of the sons of men, does this unfinished toleration of wrong on earth exist, in order that God may manifest (try) them, i. e., grant them their free decision for or against His truth (comp. Rev_22:11). For áָּøַø , to test, prove, compare chap, Ecc_9:1; Dan. 9:35, as well as the Rabbinic style, according to which this verb means “to sift,” “to winnow” (Schebiit, 5, 9). ìְáָøָí äָàֱìֹäִéí is lit.
“for God proving them,” a somewhat harsh construction, but which has its analogy in Isa_29:23.—That they might see, namely, the sons of men, for whose instruction the test is indeed instituted; since God, for His part, needs not to see it, for He knows in advance of what men are made, (Psa_103:14).—That they themselves are beasts. Men are here declared to be beasts, that is, not better than the beasts of the field, not on account of their conduct (as Psa_73:22), but on account of their final dissolution, and their inevitable sinking under the dominion of death; comp. Ecc_3:19 f.; Ecc_9:12, and also Hab_1:14; Psa_49:20. Therefore, not the brutal disposition, and the lawlessly wild conduct of the natural mind (Hitzig, Elster, etc.), but his subjection to the rule of death, and the curse of vanity (Rom_5:12 ff; Rom_8:19 ff.), furnish the reason for this placing our race on a level with the brutes (as Luther, Hengstenberg, Vaihinger. correctly assume).—“They themselves,” i.e., apart from God’s redeeming influence, Which can finally secure to their spirit eternal life and blessedness notwithstanding the subjection of the body to death (Ecc_12:7; Ecc_12:13).— ìָäֶí casts the action back on the subject, and serves to bring out this latter with special emphasis, comp. Gen_12:1; Amo_2:14; Job_6:19, etc. According to Ewald, § 315, a.— äֵîָּä ìָäֶí is a playful intensity of the sense something like the Latin ipsissimi; but Bwald can quote no other proof than this very passage.
Ecc_3:19 affords a still further illustration of the comparison between men and beasts, which extends to Ecc_3:21 inclusive, with the view of forcibly expressing the uncertainty of the destiny of the former in and after their death.—For that which befalleth the sons of men, befalleth beasts. [Lit. Ger. For chance are the sons, of men, and chance the beasts); this because they are both equally under the dominion of chance ( îִ÷ְøֶä , as chap, Ecc_2:14-15), because the lot of both is inevitably marked out for them from without, (Hengstenbebg). But it is arbitrary to refer this appellation “chance,” simply to the beginning of life in men and beasts, as “the issues of a blind fate,” (Hitzig) and it is in opposition to the remark immediately following: (in the German) “and one fate, or chance, overtakes them all;” which shows that the end of both is death, striking them all the same inexorable blow; on which account it is, by a bold metaphor, called “chance.”—As the one dieth, so dieth the other, that is, in external appearance, which is authoritative for the author’s present judgment; for he is now disregarding that life which exists for man after death, as ho simply wishes to call attention to the transitory character of the earthly existence of our race.—Yea, they have all one breath, so that man has no pre-eminence above a beast, øåּçַ is here as in Ecc_3:21, not spirit, in the stricter sense, but breath, or force of life, the animating and organizing principle in general, and is therefore, in that more extended sense, applicable to men as well as beasts, as in Gen_7:21 f.; Psa_106:29, and Ecc_8:8, of this book. On account of the broader latitude of the conception øåç , “breath,” the following remark, that man has no preeminence ( îåֹúָø ) over the beast, is meant not in the sense of an absolute, but simply of a relative equality of both natures; the poet will place both on the same level only in reference to the external identity of the close of their life (and not as Knobel supposes, who here thinks materialism openly taught). Comp. also the dogmatical and ethical section.
Ecc_3:20. All go unto one place, i.e., men and beasts; for they both alike become dust, as they were formed of dust. The following clause shows that by the “one place,” is meant the earth as a common burial place for the bodies of men and beasts; and not Scheol, “the house appointed for all living,” (Job_30:23).—All are of the dust, and all turn to dust again. Comp. Gen_3:19; Psa_104:29; Psa_107:4; Sir_40:11; Sir_41:10. All these passages, like this one, regard man solely as a material being, and, in so far, assert a perfect likeness in his death to that of beasts. The question whether the spirit of man shares this fate, is yet unanswered. The following verse refers to that, not to afford a definite answer, but to affirm the impossibility of an answer founded on sense-experience.
Ecc_3:21. For who knoweth the spirit of man that gosth upward?—The interrogative form of this and the following clause, is unconditionally required by the structure of the sentence and the context. Therefore äָòֹìָä is not, as in the masoretic text, to be written with the ä articuli, but with the ä interrogativum, (thus, äֲòìָä ) and the same way in the following, or äֲéֹøֶãֶú . That construction is therefore not, as in Joe_2:14, that of an affirmative question, but rather that of a doubtful one, expressing uncertainty. As in Psa_90:11, or above in Ecc_2:19, îִé éåֹãֵòַ äֲ points out that the matter is difficult of conception, not, at first view, clear and apparent, but rather eluding the direct observation of sense. This verse does not, therefore, assert an absolute ignorance (as Knobel. supposes), but rather some knowledge regarding the fate of the spirit in the world beyond, though wanting certainty and external evidence. Concerning the return of the spirit of man to its Divine Giver, it maintains that no one, in this world, has ever seen or survived it, just as emphatically, and in like manner, as John [Ecc_1:18; Ecc_1:1 Epist. Ecc_4:12] asserts of the sight of God, that it has never been granted to any man. A denial of the immortality of the spirit of man, as an object of inward certainty of faith [as later testimony from this standpoint of faith shows, Ecc_12:7], is as little to be found in this passage as in the assertion of John, “no one has ever seen God,” is to be found a doubt of the fact, certain to faith, of the future beholding of God (1Jn_3:2). Ignoring this state of the case, the Masora, in order to destroy the supposed skeptical sense of the passage, has punctuated the twice repeated ä , before òìä and before éøãú as articles, and so reached the thought maintained by many moderns (Geier, Dathe, Rosenmueller, Hengstenberg, Hahn): “Who knoweth the spirit of man, that which goeth upward? and the spirit of the beast, that which goeth downward to the earth?” The only just conception, according to connection and structure, is that given by the Sept., Vulg., Chald., and Syr., which not only the “rationalistic exegesis,” as Hengstenberg supposes, but also Luther, Starke, Michaelis, Elster, and many others, have adopted, who are very far from attributing to the Preacher skeptical or materialistic tendencies.
Ecc_3:22. A return to the maxim already given in Ecc_3:12, that one must cheerfully and joyously seize the present as now offered by God, and use it to get a sure path into the future.—Than that a man should rejoice in his works— áְּîַòֲùùָׂéå , i.e., in his labor and efforts in general, in his works as well as in their fruits; comp. Ecc_5:18. This “rejoicing in his own works,” is not materially different from the passage in Ecc_2:24, that he should make his soul enjoy good in his labor [Hitzig thinks otherwise], nor from the expression (Ecc_3:12-13) “to rejoice and do good,” etc.—For that is his portion—i.e., for nothing farther is allotted to him here below, comp. Ecc_2:10.—For who shall bring him to see what shall be after him?—That is, not into the condition after death, into the relations of human life in another world, but, as shown by the parallel passages, Ecc_6:12; Ecc_2:19 : into the future conditions of human life, into the relations as they shall be on earth after his departure from life (especially in his immediate surroundings and sphere of activity, comp. Ecc_2:19). This sentence involves, therefore, neither a denial of the personal continuance of man (Hitzig), nor an authorization of the Epicurean principle: “Enjoy before death, that you may not go out empty” (Knobel), nor, indeed, any reference to the world beyond, but simply an exhortation to profit by the present in cheerful and diligent occupation, without being anxious and doubting about the future, which is indeed inaccessible to our human knowledge. Hengstenberg justly observes: “Man knows not what God will do,” Ecc_3:11. Therefore, it is foolish to chase after happiness by toilsome exertion, or to be full of anxiety and grief, Ecc_3:9-10; and quite as foolish (chap, Ecc_6:12) to engage in many wide reaching schemings, to chase after the ἀäçëüôçôá ðëïý ôïõ (1Ti_6:17) to gather and heap for him to whom God will give it, Ecc_2:26; but, on the contrary, it is rational to enjoy the present. Properly understood, therefore, this verse draws its practical consequence not from the verses 19–21 immediately preceding, but from the contents of the entire chapter.
ut unda impdlilur unda,
Urgeturque prior venienti, urgetque priorem,
Tempora sic fugiunt pariter pariterque sequuntur.
The figure here, however, although presenting this general image, has something else that is both rare and striking. We know it from the words ðִøְãָּó and éְëַ÷ִּùׁ which, as thus used, immediately call, up the idea of the flying homicide with the avenger or the inquisitor [ éְëַ÷ִּùׁ ] behind him. See how øãó is used in such passages as Deu_19:6; Jos_20:5 [ äַãָּí àַçֲøֵé äָøöֵ֗úַ åְâå éִøְøּó âàֵ֗ì ], and áִּ÷ֵּù denoting inquisitor (pursuer or avenger), in places like 2Sa_4:11 [ àֲëַ÷ִּùׁ àֶú ãָּîå֗ ], Eze_3:18; Eze_3:20; Eze_33:8, and, without ãí [blood], 1Sa_20:16, besides other places where this old law of pursuit is referred to. They all show that the words [and especially áִּ÷ֵּù ] had acquired a judicial, a forensic, or technical sense. The figure here, however strange it may seem, can hardly be mistaken: God will make inquisition for that which is pursued, that which has gone before us, seemingly fled away, as though it had escaped forever. They are not gone, these past ages of wrong; they shall be called up again. They shall be overtaken and made “to stand up in their lot,” at some “latter, day” of judgment and inquisition. There can be no severance of times from each other; îָä ùֶּׁääָéָä ëְëָø çåּà ;
What was is present now;
The future has already been;
And God demands again the ages fled.
The thought is closely allied to the cyclical idea so prominent elsewhere in this book (see Ecc_1:9-10; Ecc_6:10), and the idea of the olam as the unity of the cosmos in time. As each power or thing in space, according to an old thought existing long before Newton, is present dynamically and statically in every other part of space, so is every time present in every other time, and in the whole of olamic duration. The cosmos is one in both respects. It is the òåìí of God “to which nothing can be added (Ecc_3:14) and from which nothing can be diminished.” But besides this cyclical idea, which would seem like asserting an actual reappearance, it may be said, with equal emphasis, that the ages come again in judgment, and as really, too, in one sense, as when they were here, in the events to be judged. God shall arraign these homicidal centuries; “He shall call to them and they shall stand up, and say here we are” (Isa_48:13; Job_38:35). It is the same great idea of judgment that seems to pervade all the writer says, and which comes out so clearly, and so solemnly, at the close: “For God will bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil.” It is that great thought which has ever been in the souls of men, and, which they cannot get rid of. It appears in the Old Testament, Psa_1:5 [ ìֹà éָ÷åּîåּ øְùָòéí áַּîִּùְׁëָּè , “the wicked shall not stand in the judgment];” Daniel 12,; Ecc_12:11; Job_21:30 [ ëִé ìְéåֹí àֵéã éֵçָùֶׂêְ øָò ]; Proverbs and Prophets sparsim. How prominent the idea, though indefinite as to time and manner, in the Greek dramatic poetry: there must be retribution for wrong, however it may take place, and however long delayed,—retribution open, penal, positive, and not merely as concealed in blind physical consequences. It presents itself more, or less in all mythologies; but its deepest seat is in the human conscience. If there is any thing that may be called a tenet of natural religion, it is this, that there will be, that there must be, a righting of all wrongs, and a way and a time for its manifestation. It holds its place amid all speculative difficulties; it rises over all objections that any philosophy, or any science, can bring against it in respect to time, place, or manner; it remains in the face of all doubts and questions arising out of any doctrine of eschatology, so called. Deeper than , any speculative reasoning lies in the soul the feeling that tells us it must be so. We cannot bear the thought that the world’s drama shall go on forever without any closing act, without any óõíôÝëåéá , reckoning, or winding up, whether final, or preparatory to some higher era. We cannot read a poor work of fiction, even, without feeling pain if it does not end well,—if right is not made clear, and wrong punished, even according to our poor fallen standard of right and wrong. The worst man has more or less of this feeling. We have all reason to fear the judgment; but when the mind is in something of a proper state, or when reason and conscience are predominant, the soul would rather suffer the pain arising from the risk and fear of the individual condemnation, than obtain deliverance from it by the loss of the glorious idea.
This doctrine of judgment is not only in harmony with that cyclical idea which is strongly suggested by the general aspect of the passage, and especially by what immediately precedes in this same verse, but may be regarded, in some respects, as identical with it. If any choose so to view it, the ages past may be said to be judged in the ages that follow, though still in connection with the thought of some general and final manifestation. Such, is the view which, is most impressively given by Rabbi Schelomo in his comments on the passage. He deduces from it a notion similar to one that is now a favorite with some of our modern authorities. It is, that history repeats itself; the events in one age being types of succeeding events on a larger scale in another. The Jewish writer has the same thought, though he gives it more of a retributive aspect, as though these types came over again in judgment. As we should expect, too, he draws his examples from the Scriptural history, or from traditions connected with it. Thus Esau pursues Jacob. It is the same thing coming over, on a larger scale, when Egypt pursues the children of Israel. Other examples are given from other parts of the Jewish history, and then he says, generally: “that which is going to be in the latter day is the exemplar [ ãåâîä , it should be ãéâîä , a Rabbinical word formed from the Greek äåῖãìá , ðáñÜäåéãìá ] of what already has been; as in the first, so it is in the last” [ áàçøåðç ëàùø áøàùåðç ]. He means that the first event is the äåῖãìá , the ðáñÜäåéãìá , or paradigm, to which the latter is adapted, either retributively, or for some other purpose, and taken, generally, on a larger scale.
The commentary of Aben Ezra on the passage is also well worthy of note. His general remark on the whole verse is that God’s way is one—that is, that the world, whether regarded in space or time, has a perfect unity of idea, àìäéí òì ãøê àäú îּòùä , and then he thus proceeds to explain the verse: “What was (or is), already had there been like it, and that which is to be, of old there had been the same; and that which is pursued ( ðִøְãָּó ), or the past, is that which is present, and that (the present) lies between the past and the future. The meaning of it is that God seeks from time that it shall be pursued, time pursuing after time, and never fail; for the time that is past again becomes the present [ äòִåîã that which stands], and the time that is to be, shall be again like that which was, and So it is all one time. If we divide time into the future and the past, then, in the course of things ( âìâì the wheel, or mundane orbit), it becomes clear that every portion ever pursues after one point (or towards one point), and that is the centre, so that the portion that was in the East appears again in the West, and conversely; and to the place of the world’s revolution there is no beginning from which such motion commences; for every beginning is an end, and every end a beginning, and that which is pursued, that is the centre, and so it is clear to us that all the work of God is on one way,”—or, as we would say, on one idea, ever repeating itself. See something like this in the Book of Problems, ascribed to Aristotle, Vol. XIV., Leip.; Prob. XVIII., Sec. 3, on the question, “How shall we take the terms Before and After?” (on the supposition of an eternal repeating cycle).
It is the idea in Ecc_3:14 which seems mainly to have influenced Aben Ezra, and other Jewish commentators [such as Levi Ben Gerson, in his profound book entitled Milhamoth ha-Schem], in the interpretation of these words of the 15th: “I learned that all which God made is for eternity [or the world time, ìòåìí ]; to it there is no adding,